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Abstract 
This article discusses the possible impact of withdrawal from the EU on social security in Scotland. 
Despite the relatively limited role of EU membership in shaping the UK social security system, the 
effects of Brexit could be significant, even if largely indirect. The recent EU and independence 
referenda have allowed devolved elites to portray Scotland as more concerned with social justice and 
more internationalist than the UK as a whole. Maintaining or enhancing EU citizens’ social rights 
would be in keeping with this self-image. The Scottish Government’s view that Scotland has a greater 
need for immigration than other parts of the UK provides a further, pragmatic argument for 
enhancing its attractiveness as a destination by allowing migrants to access family benefits in 
particular. The limited extent of devolved social security competences means this is not currently an 
option. Even if the push for a second independence referendum following the Brexit vote has been 
put on hold for now, the possibility remains that the Scottish Government will seek renegotiation of 
the constitutional settlement. Social security is an obvious field for further devolution. The door could 
hence be opened to divergence from DWP on the entitlements of EU migrants.  
Introduction 
The impact of EU membership varies dramatically depending on the field of law; consequently, the 
impact of Brexit will vary dramatically. At one end of the spectrum, it is scarcely an exaggeration to 
say that UK environmental law largely is EU environmental law. Directives in this field exert a strong 
centripetal force between member states and between autonomous regions within them, so that 
where divergence occurs this is as likely to be due to lax or delayed transposition as to differences of 
policy objective.1 Since the environment is a devolved matter in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, removal of this force for convergence raises the prospect of more significant differences of 
approach emerging.2 Social security is closer to the other end of the spectrum – not untouched by 
EU law, certainly on the radar of European policymakers, but subject to much less Union influence. 3 
The influence of the EU is largely limited to three key aspects of social security policy: the 
elimination of gender based discrimination from national systems, rules on when citizens of other 
member states can access a host state’s system and on the portability of entitlements on 
emigration. Otherwise, each member state retains a largely free hand regarding what it offers, 
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although it is somewhat ironic that Brexit occurs just as moves to establish a social rights pillar 
suggest the EU may take a closer interest in social protection4 and when there is a live proposal for a 
common European unemployment benefit.5 The impact of withdrawal from the EU on social 
security, then, is likely to be smaller overall because of the limited extent of supranational influence. 
It is also likely to be less regional in character because constitutional law and practice have left less 
space for divergence, with control of only a small part of the system (in expenditure terms) devolved 
to Scotland and Northern Ireland traditionally reluctant to depart dramatically from Westminster 
policy.  
Brexit will nonetheless have particular impacts on Scottish social security, but this article argues that 
the big questions are political as much as legal. Withdrawal from the EU, the contrasting referendum 
results in Scotland and in the UK as whole and the ongoing political fall-out form part of a wider 
process; whether or not one accepts the proposition that Scotland is a very different polity to the 
rest of the UK, the resounding remain vote is a further tool that the Scottish Government can use to 
construct a vision of Scotland as different to the rest of the UK.6 Following hot on the heels of the 
2014 referendum on independence, the Brexit debate as a whole can be portrayed as a continuation 
of the independence campaign by other means, albeit that the renewed uncertainty around 
Scotland’s immediate future within the UK that followed the vote for withdrawal appears to have 
abated for now.7 Still, that tensions remain between the two tiers of government was evident 
following the emergence of a leaked position paper on post-withdrawal migration policy.8 This 
occurs at a time when freshly devolved social security powers provide another opportunity to 
demonstrate Scotland’s otherness through the development of (the Scottish Government promises) 
a fairer, more compassionate model. The independence referendum was followed by the major UK 
parties agreeing to an enhanced devolution settlement and there have been calls for a similar 
response to the EU referendum .9 With further social security powers among the most obvious 
candidates for devolution, the potential is clear for Brexit to have a profound, though indirect, 
impact on the still-emerging Scottish welfare state. 
EU membership, Brexit and social security 
There is no EU welfare state, no single “solidaristic communit[y],” only a set of rules on the 
“interchangeability of solidaristic communities in the Union that allows Union citizens to be affiliated 
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with the one of their residence.” As Harris explains elsewhere in this issue,10 recent CJEU judgments 
have “narrowed down” even this access to host state welfare systems from something approaching 
a right of citizenship to an entitlement to be earned through “economic contribution in a host 
Member State.”11 The other key impacts of EU membership on social security in the UK concern the 
portability of benefits for people leaving for another member state and curbs on gender based 
discrimination. 
The latter two points can be dealt with relatively briefly. The key judgment against the UK in respect 
of gender based discrimination in social security concerned occupational pension schemes rather 
than any state benefit. The finding that accrued pension rights constituted pay and that 
discrimination between male and female employees – for example in age criteria – was 
consequently prohibited did not directly apply to public provision.12 Nonetheless, Wikeley and Ogus 
argue that the enforced equalisation of pensionable age in occupational schemes made equivalent 
changes to the state pension “inevitable,”13 a process that has now been completed.14 Given that 
this is now being followed by a further increase in pensionable age for both men and women, 
lowering the age for women following Brexit appears unthinkable. It should also be noted that while 
this example of direct discrimination against men has been dismantled, EU membership has done 
less to prevent indirect discrimination against women. On one hand, the Supreme Court’s finding 
that Directive 97/81/EC prohibits discrimination against part-time workers in their pension rights 
might be expected to primarily benefit female employees.15 On the other, women continue to face 
disadvantage in their ability to meet the contribution requirements for insurance-based benefits16 
and the Supreme Court has found that the Secretary of State is entitled to make regulations 
implementing cuts to social assistance benefits that impact primarily on women, as long as this is in 
pursuit of a legitimate objective such as controlling public spending.17 
Brexit may have a greater impact on the portability of UK benefits. Certainly, if the UK leaves the EEA 
as well as the EU the state will no longer be subject to any obligation to allow EU migrants to export 
child benefit to their children in another member state or to export other benefits to its own citizens 
living in other member states. That is not to say the practice would definitely cease, at least for 
continuing claimants: it is not uncommon for transitional protection to be given to those who would 
otherwise lose income due to social security reforms. Media reports indicate that the position of 
British retirees in other member states will be unchanged after 201918 and the UK and EU’s joint 
progress report of December 2017 reinforces this with its commitment to “reciprocal protection… to 
                                                          
10 N Harris, ‘Welfare rights, austerity and the decision to leave the EU: influences on UK social security law’ 
(2018) 25(X) Journal of Social Security Law XX 
11 R Bebayev, ‘Re-shaping the paradigm of social solidarity in the EU: on the UK’s welfare reforms and pre- and 
post-EU referendum developments’ (2016) 18(4) European Journal of Social Security 356, 365 
12 Case C-262/88 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] 2 CMLR 513 
13 NJ Wikeley and AI Ogus, The law of social security (London: Butterworths, 2002) 
14 Pensions Act 1995 c26 sch 5; Pensions Act 2011 c19 s1 
15 Ministry of Justice v O’Brien [2013] UKSC 6 [2013] 1 WLR 522 
16 N Duvvury, A Ní Léime, A Callan, L Price and M Simpson, Older women workers’ access to pensions: 
vulnerabilities, perspectives and strategies (Galway: ICSG, 2012) 
17 R (on the application of SG and others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 [2015] 1 
WLR 1449; for discussion of a possible softening of this position, see M Simpson, ‘The benefit cap fails human 
rights test’ (2017) 24(3) Journal of Social Security Law 148 
18 S Brodbeck, ‘Britain and EU reach agreement over expats' state pension after Brexit’ (Daily Telegraph, 13 
September 2017) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/pensions-retirement/news/britain-eu-reach-agreement-
expats-state-pension-brexit/> 
This is a pre-copy edited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in the Journal of Social 
Security Law following peer-review. The definitive published version (M Simpson, ‘Brexit and devolved social 
security in Scotland: a tale of two referenda’ (2018) 25(1) Journal of Social Security Law 56-73) is available 
online through Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service. 
enable the effective exercise of rights derived from Union law and based on past life choices, where 
those citizens have exercised free movement rights” before the withdrawal date.19 As Harris notes, 
the salience of this question to future claimants will to some extent depend on the impact of Brexit 
on the ability of UK citizens to live in other European countries.20 
The greatest impact of EU membership – and therefore, potentially, of Brexit – has been on the 
ability of citizens exercising free movement rights to access their host state’s social security system. 
Although “welfare state walls” have been more fiercely defended than “geographical boundaries,” 
legislation and case law have gradually expanded the social rights gained as an EU citizen.21 Initially, 
social security rights were closely linked with the free movement of workers rather than citizens. As 
at national level, for a period it seemed that social rights for workers would act as precursors to 
social rights for all.22 This process was initially driven by the CJEU stretching the definition of ‘worker’ 
so as to confer entitlements upon progressively greater numbers of people23 – part time 
employees,24 students on placement,25 jobseekers26 and workers’ dependents.27 At its most 
ambitious, the court would declare that “Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status 
of nationals of the Member States,” with the implication that, in most cases, “those who find 
themselves in the same situation… enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality.” 
This implies the emergence of a new sharing community based on a “certain degree of financial 
solidarity between nationals of a host Member State and nationals of other Member States.”28  
Directive 2004/38/EC29 largely placed these developments on a legislative footing, further expanding 
the definition of ‘worker’ to include jobseekers who have previously worked for one year in the host 
state, individuals who leave employment for vocational training and individuals temporarily unable 
to work due to illness. Member states are also prevented from expelling social assistance claimants 
unless they have become an “unreasonable burden” or jobseekers under most circumstances. The 
distinction between workers and non-workers is clearest during the first three months of residence, 
when migrants other than workers and their families have no automatic right to access the host 
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state’s social assistance systems.30 In recent years the EU institutions have envisaged more 
significant convergence in social rights. The European Parliament has advocated a European 
minimum income guarantee31 – implying a common floor for social assistance benefits – and the 
inclusion of social security in the proposed new pillar of social rights.32 Meanwhile, the Commission 
has supported a feasibility study into a common European unemployment insurance benefit, albeit 
that formidable political and operational challenges stand in the way of such a development.33  
The partial reversal of the progress made in access to host states’ social security systems in the 
aftermath of the 21st century enlargements of the Union contrasts sharply with this vision, but is in 
keeping with the EU’s fluctuating interest in social policy matters generally.34 Rules on EU migrants’ 
access to social security in the UK were reformed in 2013.35 Additional questions have been added to 
the habitual residence test used to assess whether individuals of any nationality seeking income-
related benefits or social housing after less than two years’ residence in the common travel area 
(UK, Ireland, Channel Islands and Isle of Man) are legally present, “habitually resident” and have 
“sufficient ties” to the UK.”36 Those of less than three months’ residence are now ineligible for 
jobseeker’s allowance.37 Future reform targeting “new” EEA claimants will prevent JSA claims longer 
than six months’ duration “unless [the claimant] can demonstrate they are actively seeking work and 
have a genuine prospect of work” and remove eligibility for housing benefit.38 These changes appear 
compatible with EU requirements.  Directive 2004/38/EC confers no right to social protection during 
the first three months of residence; those who are employed for less than a year in the host state 
retain the status of ‘worker’ (and the associate access to social protection) for only six months, while 
non-workers forfeit their right to reside after three months’ residence unless they have sufficient 
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immigrants, says Iain Duncan Smith’ (Guardian, 18 December 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
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‘We will block benefits to new EU migrants, says Cameron’ (Daily Telegraph, 18 December 2013) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10524285/We-will-block-benefits-to-new-EU-
migrants-says-Cameron.html> accessed 24 January 2014 
36 Department for Work and Pensions, ‘Improved benefit test for migrants launched’ (DWP, 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/improved-benefit-test-for-migrants-launched> accessed 24 January 
2014 
37 Department for Work and Pensions, ‘JSA(IB) – three months residence requirement’ (Memo DMG 28/13, 
DWP, 2013) 
38 Department for Work and Pensions, ‘Improved benefit test for migrants launched’ (DWP, 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/improved-benefit-test-for-migrants-launched> accessed 24 January 
2014 
This is a pre-copy edited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in the Journal of Social 
Security Law following peer-review. The definitive published version (M Simpson, ‘Brexit and devolved social 
security in Scotland: a tale of two referenda’ (2018) 25(1) Journal of Social Security Law 56-73) is available 
online through Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service. 
resources to avoid becoming a “burden” on host state welfare systems.39 In Dano, the CJEU 
confirmed that an EU national with no connection to the labour market of the host state and no 
independent resources has no right of residence and consequently no right to social protection.40 In 
subsequent cases it was held that even would-be claimants who had previously been employed and 
were actively seeking work in the host state could be denied benefits.41 
Consequently, while a ‘soft’ Brexit involving continuing EEA/EFTA membership or a similar level of 
access to the internal market would probably mean EU citizens’ social rights in the UK remaining 
largely in line with what they would be when migrating between member states, it is far from clear 
what those rights are likely to be in the future. As noted above, the UK has been able to curtail EU 
migrants’ access to social security even in advance of Brexit.42 Shortly before the referendum the 
Council indicated that it was prepared to authorise further rollback by allowing member states to 
temporarily exclude workers exercising free movement rights from in-work benefits due to 
pressures resulting from an “inflow… of an exceptional magnitude.”43 For Bebayev, this 
“compromise” further legitimises member states’ “narrow and exclusionary interpretation of Union 
workers’ and job-seekers’ rights.”44 In any case, remaining in the EEA currently seems an improbable 
outcome after the June general election returned a Conservative government whose manifesto 
promised withdrawal not only from the EU, but from the “customs union”45 (albeit that continued 
EFTA membership has not been entirely ruled out).46 A ‘hard’ Brexit, involving outright withdrawal 
from the single market, would probably put EU citizens in the UK on the same footing as third 
country nationals; and the UK is “notoriously stingy about allowing third-country nationals access to 
social benefits and exporting social benefits (including state pensions) to British citizens who live in 
other countries.”47 Although the European Social Charter will remain an alternative basis on which to 
advocate social rights for migrants, its prohibition of ‘duration of residence’ requirements for 
nationals of other contracting state seeking to access social and medical assistance on the same 
basis as host state nationals did not prevent the recent reforms and can be expected to remain 
relatively impotent. 
The largely common approach to social security across the UK means that the legal and policy 
impact of Brexit would essentially be the same UK-wide, but the social and economic impact would 
not necessarily be uniform. The Scottish Government argues that Scotland has a particular need for 
immigration due to demographic challenges and skills shortages48 and IFS economic projections for 
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an independent Scotland suggest that public borrowing would be lower in a “high-migration 
scenario,” largely because the average age of the population would be lower.49 Consequently, claims 
by the Home Office that it is seeking to develop “an approach for the whole of the UK” in post-Brexit 
migration policy have generated some scepticism in Edinburgh,50 where the Scottish Government 
has for various reasons emphasised its commitment to “retaining membership of the European 
Single Market.”51 Proposals for tighter controls on EU migrants’ access to the UK labour market, 
social security entitlements, right to enter the state as jobseekers and ability to bring family 
members with them are particularly likely to be seen as impediments to the Scottish Government’s 
objective of attracting people to Scotland and as having the “potential to seriously harm Scotland’s 
economy.”52 Public opinion appears to be less strongly in favour of significant reductions in 
immigration compared to England and Wales and significantly more likely to view immigration as 
having a positive or neutral effect, but with only a minority (10 per cent) in favour of increased 
immigration.53  
The extent to which (prospective) social security entitlements influence decisions on migration is 
controversial. The perception that people might migrate in search of a more generous welfare state, 
is a recurring political concern and has formed part of the UK debate on both EU and wider 
immigration in recent years. This reflects a Europe-wide concern about ‘benefit tourism’ that has 
intensified since the accession of Romania and Bulgaria54 and is acknowledged in the Council’s pre-
referendum statement, even though the same document highlights the fact that economically 
inactive and even jobseeking migrants have no specific right to social security or social assistance 
under EU law.55 Academic and government research suggests that, on the whole, anticipated social 
security rights play a minor role in decisions to migrate compared to labour market conditions.56 
However, family- and child-related benefits have been found to act to some extent as a ‘pull’ 
factor.57 While these are not currently devolved, future control of child tax credits and the child 
element of universal credit is likely to appeal to the Scottish Government given its focus on child 
poverty reduction.58 Devolution would present an opportunity not only to adjust the level of 
benefits, but to ease migrants’ access if this were deemed a suitable means of stimulating 
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immigration and encouraging immigrants to remain in Scotland rather than move on to other parts 
of the UK.59 For example, prior to the referendum the Council agreed that the UK could phase in EU 
migrants’ access to in-work benefits over a longer period, suspend access if high immigration 
numbers create a temporary “exceptional situation” and reduce child benefit payments in respect of 
dependent children living elsewhere in the EU.60 It can be anticipated that equivalent measures (at 
least) will be put in place following withdrawal; a future Scottish Parliament with devolved 
competence for the relevant benefits might prefer to take a different path. 
Brexit, human rights, citizenship and social security 
It is arguably an exaggeration to claim that “Brexit undermines and imperils the… human rights 
framework of Scotland.”61 However, it is clear that withdrawal from the European Union forms part 
of a wider political “climate of hostility to human rights” in the UK.62 Although the ECHR and Human 
Rights Act 1998 are legally separate issues from the EU and Brexit, the two are frequently conflated 
in popular media critiques of interference in domestic affairs and erosion of the UK’s sovereignty by 
‘Europe’.63 While migrants’ political, social and residence rights are clearly vulnerable following 
Brexit, the surrounding political climate has itself been recognised as a potential threat to human 
rights more widely.64 In the face of a potential roll-back of rights, Harvey argues that the time is ripe 
for reinvigoration of Northern Ireland’s dormant debate on a regional Bill of Rights.65 Scotland’s First 
Minister has already expressed her desire to incorporate more of the international human rights 
framework into Scottish law66 and a debate is underway as to the best means of enhancing the 
protection of social rights in areas of devolved competence, including the newly devolved parts of 
the social security system.67 The Scottish Human Rights Commission argues that progress on this 
front would represent an appropriate devolved-level response to Brexit.68 
The European Convention on Human Rights is the most important international human rights 
agreement in the UK, being uniquely incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. 
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The same Conservative party manifesto that promised a referendum on continued membership of 
the EU included a commitment to repeal the Human Rights Act to make way for a British Bill of 
Rights.69 This project now appears to be on hold until after Brexit has been completed,70 with 
denunciation of the ECHR itself apparently off the agenda for now,71 and would in any case be likely 
to have a limited impact on social security. The ECHR is more concerned with civil and political than 
social rights and those provisions that can most readily be deployed in defence of social security 
entitlements are the non-absolute article 8 (the right to family life) and article 1, protocol 1 (P1-1, 
the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions). Interference with these rights can normally be 
justified on the basis of a competing public policy objective.72 Nonetheless, there have been recent 
signs that the courts are becoming more willing to question the ECHR-compliance of social security 
policy, normally because of its impact on children.73 Repeal of the Human Rights Act – depending on 
the content of the successor Bill of Rights – might therefore stymie the evolution of a new, human 
rights based protection of social security entitlements at UK level. Although the Conservatives 
endorse “the commitments made when we signed the Convention,”74 the party rejects the alleged 
subsequent “mission creep” of the ECtHR – which could imply reversal of the relatively recent 
application of P1-1 to non-contributory benefits.75 The Scotland Act 1998 is an alternative, stronger 
source of protection for the ECHR rights in Scotland, prohibiting the Scottish Parliament from 
legislating contrary to the Convention – mirroring provisions in the Northern Irish and Welsh 
devolution settlements. In a post-Brexit, post-Human Rights Act era, then, any “human rights legal 
deficit”76 at UK level would not necessarily be reflected at devolved level. Devolved benefits in 
Scotland would still have to comply with the ECHR rights while reserved benefits might not. 
Although Parliament could, in principle, legislate to remove reference to the ECHR from the 
devolution legislation, this seems unlikely given its central place in Northern Ireland’s peace 
agreement, to which the devolution project is inextricably linked.77 
Raising the profile of social rights in Scottish law, especially if the European Social Charter were the 
chosen vehicle for doing so, would have still greater potential to push aspects of social security in a 
different direction to UK policy and even recent CJEU judgments. In particular, an enforceable right 
to social assistance (protected by article 13) could push the evolution of certain benefits in the 
opposite direction to their current trajectory under DWP stewardship. In 2013 the level of benefits in 
the UK was found to comply with article 13, which requires social assistance to guarantee an income 
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not manifestly below 50% of the equivalised median.78 Since then, real-terms and cash cuts to the 
main income replacement benefits, including a freeze on uprating, the household benefit cap, a two-
child limit on tax credits and various reforms to housing benefit mean the conclusion is becoming 
increasingly questionable.79 Most of these benefits are not devolved, but can be topped up in 
Scotland – the Scottish Government’s continued commitment to child poverty reduction points to 
the possible use of the top-up power to increase child-related benefits and incorporation of the ESC 
could lead to further pressures in this direction.80 Article 13 also limits the extent to which the UK 
may restrict access to social assistance for lawful migrants from other contracting states. The recent 
provisions on universal credit for EEA migrants81 are explicitly contrary to this requirement, although 
(as discussed above) in conformity with recent CJEU judgments shifting the focus from citizenship to 
contribution in determining access to social security in the host state.82 Article 16, which protects the 
right of the family to social, legal and economic protection, may also be relevant. While the 
European Committee of Social Rights has generally used this article to assess the adequacy of child 
benefits or family allowances,83 its requirement that contracting states ensure “the necessary 
conditions for the full development of the family” is potentially of wider application in ensuring that 
claimants have sufficient income to support the development of their children. 
The extent to which the ESC or any other social rights agreement might shape the development of 
Scottish benefits would, of course, depend on two things. The future extent of devolved social 
security competences – which forms the focus of the section below – will be crucial as the Scottish 
Parliament is currently able to determine the level and form (including any rules on migrants’ access) 
of a minority of benefits. Meanwhile, the weight that would have to be afforded to social rights in 
the development of devolved social security would depend on the legislative vehicle chosen for their 
protection in Scottish law. Possible models range from Scottish Ministers’ rather vague duty to take 
whatever steps they deem appropriate to give effect to the rights contained in the UNCRC,84 to 
Welsh Ministers’ somewhat “more robust” obligation to have due regard to the UNCRC85 or the 
stronger model of the Human Rights Act. 86 While none of these approaches could prevent the 
Scottish Parliament legislating in defiance of a given set of rights if it wished to do so, the latter 
model in particular would create a fairly strong presumption in favour of compliance. Consequently, 
there would be a potential driver of divergence in respect of benefits under devolved control as 
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policy development would be guided by a different set of human rights obligations to that applicable 
to the UK Government. 
Brexit, independence, devolution and social security 
Discussing Brexit from a Northern Irish perspective, Harvey writes: “The appropriate response to 
what we are facing is not passive acceptance.”87 Whether “passive acceptance” is a fair summary of 
the response in Northern Ireland’s fragmented political landscape varies dramatically depending on 
which party’s position one considers. Early opinion polls pointing to a resounding victory in the June 
2017 general election for a Conservative party that has eagerly embraced withdrawal since the 
referendum result88 were not reflected in the ultimate outcome, but the Conservatives nonetheless 
emerged as the largest party in the House of Commons and have been able to form a minority 
government. It might therefore be argued that the response from a large section of the electorate, 
and the current UK governing party, is not passive acceptance, but enthusiasm. There are few signs 
of passive acceptance in Scotland, at least from the electorally dominant party of government at 
Holyrood, the Scottish National Party. 
Harris notes in this issue that “modern welfare states share a broad mission to fulfil normative social 
expectations about the basic requirements of human organisation and personal welfare and 
development.”89 Those normative expectations do not necessarily take the same form in every part 
of the UK.90 In the words of a former chair of the Scottish Human Rights Commission, through the 
two recent referenda “Scotland has presented its credentials internationally and it’s now understood 
as to what its outlook is and what kind of country it wants to become.”91 That is, a more egalitarian 
country, more concerned with human rights – including social rights – and social justice, more 
internationalist too than the rest of the UK/England/the Westminster elite. The independence 
referendum was to a large extent a debate about whether social justice could best be served within 
or outside the UK92 and as the UK government moved towards a referendum on and then 
withdrawal from the EU, continued enthusiasm for European integration has also become 
increasingly central to the “Scottish brand.”93 
Much literature tries to put its finger on “the distinctive identity, values and policy preferences of 
the Scottish people.” 94 Even prior to legislative devolution aspects of Scottish social policy were 
                                                          
87 C Harvey, ‘Reflections on human rights and citizenship in a changing constitutional context’ (Brexiting and 
Rights conference, Belfast, September 2016) 
<http://www.caj.org.uk/files/2016/10/11/3_Brexiting_and_Rights_-_Colin_Harvey_CAJ-TJI_2016.pdf> 
88 A Kirk and P Scott, ‘General election 2017: latest polls and odds tracker’ (Daily Telegraph, rolling updates) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/who-will-win-general-election-2017-latest-polls-odds-tracker/> 
accessed 1 June 2017 
89 N Harris, ‘Welfare rights, austerity and the decision to leave the EU: influences on UK social security law’ 
(2018) 25(X) Journal of Social Security Law XX 
90 M Simpson, ‘Renegotiating social citizenship in the age of devolution’ (2017) 44(4) Journal of Law and 
Society 646 
91 R Johnston and A Miller, ‘Interview with Professor Alan Miller’ (2016) 75 Scottish Human Rights Journal 2, 3 
92 G Mooney and G Scott, ‘The 2014 Scottish independence debate: questions of social welfare and social 
justice’ (2015) 23(1) Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 5; J Hearn, ‘Nationalism and normality: a comment on 
the Scottish independence referendum’ (2014) 38(4) Dialectical Anthropology 505 
93 G Mooney and C Williams, ‘Forging new “ways of life”? Social policy and nation building in devolved 
Scotland and Wales’ (2006) 26(3) Critical Social Policy 608  
94 N McEwen, ‘The territorial politics of social policy development in multilevel states’ (2005) 15(4) Regional 
and Federal Studies 537, 543 
This is a pre-copy edited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in the Journal of Social 
Security Law following peer-review. The definitive published version (M Simpson, ‘Brexit and devolved social 
security in Scotland: a tale of two referenda’ (2018) 25(1) Journal of Social Security Law 56-73) is available 
online through Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service. 
claimed to be “fairer,” more caring than south of the border, although the reserved status of social 
security meant that “the scope for a transformative approach” has until now remained limited.95 
Recent research finds nationalist politicians are heavily invested in the notion of a “fairer 
Scotland,”96 advancing explanations from the theological (non-conformist churches’ concern for 
poverty) to the literary (Burns).97 However, unionist politicians – in line with much of the literature98 
– tend to suggest that while Scotland’s political elite is significantly to the left of the UK’s, the gap in 
public opinion is much narrower. Digging deeper into the findings, nationalists themselves 
acknowledge that egalitarianism has not historically been an exclusively Scottish perspective, but a 
“defining feature of Britishness,” one that (they claim) has been progressively abandoned by the 
Conservatives and other unionist parties, but to which Scotland remains committed.99 From this 
perspective, it is Westminster that is undermining the post-World War 2 welfare settlement, 
therefore more devolution or even independence might be necessary (in part) to save the UK 
welfare state from the UK government. 
Keating suggests that a distinctly Scottish attitude to European integration, too, is an elite rather 
than a popular phenomenon. Elected representatives overwhelmingly favoured remain prior to the 
referendum. Both Labour and the SNP had shaken off their previous Euro-scepticism during the 
1980s and the Scottish Conservative leadership was much more united around continued 
membership than their Westminster counterparts. On the eve of the referendum, the SNP and the 
consistently pro-EU Liberal Democrats officially backed ‘remain’; Labour, Conservative and Green 
Party representatives were at liberty to vote as they wished, but the party leaderships and most of 
their MSPs were solidly pro-remain.100 Despite a resounding vote in favour of ‘remain’, the picture 
among the population as a whole is presented as more “ambivalent,” with social research suggesting 
“less Euroscepticism but not a lot of Europhilia” compared to England.101 In common with the ‘social 
democratic Scotland’ thesis, nationalists have an opportunity to argue that the UK elite is 
abandoning formerly British values in a way that is unacceptable to the Scottish people. As the UK 
government stands accused of dismantling the welfare state, a Conservative party under whose 
leadership the UK entered the EU is now taking the state out of the EU, in the process becoming a 
cheerleader for an outcome that most of its own leadership opposed during the referendum.102 
The ultimate impact of Brexit on Scottish social security is intimately linked to this wider clash of 
values between Scottish and UK elites that manifested itself in both the independence and EU 
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referenda. The 2017 general election may be as important as either referendum in determining what 
happens next. The SNP had initially seized on UK withdrawal from the EU, against the wishes of 62% 
of Scottish voters in the referendum, as a development of sufficient magnitude to justify a second 
poll on independence.103 If independence had been the ultimate outcome of Brexit, and Scotland 
had remained within or gone on to rejoin the EU, then many of the issues identified by McKeever in 
this issue104 as potentially affecting workers who commute across the Irish border would also have 
become relevant to cross-border workers in Great Britain: up to 110,000 people are thought to live 
in England and work in Scotland or vice versa.105 This outcome, though, seems very unlikely at 
present: the fall in support and significant loss of parliamentary representation for the SNP on 8 June 
clearly dealt a blow to secessionist ambitions, prompting a swift retreat from calls for another vote 
on independence,106 albeit that the message of the subsequent party conference was that 
“campaigning for independence” remains high on the agenda.107 More pertinently, in recent Scottish 
history, signs of enthusiasm for independence have typically been followed by attempts to placate 
the electorate with more devolved powers. The election of the first SNP government in 2007 was 
followed swiftly by the appointment of the Calman Commission, 108 whose recommendations for 
additional devolution shaped the Scotland Act 2012. The 45% vote in favour of independence in 
2014 resulted in the convening of the Smith Commission, which again advocated new devolved 
powers including, for the first time, significant social security competences.109 The Scotland Act 2016 
put the Smith recommendations into action. The First Minister’s speech on a second referendum 
prompted an immediate call from Gordon Brown, the former Prime Minister and an influential voice 
in favour of further devolution at the time of the independence referendum,110 for federalisation of 
the UK, implying more powers to Scotland.111  
Whether this “constitutional chain reaction”112 in fact continues remains in the realms of 
speculation. Had the recent general election delivered an SNP success of similar magnitude to 2015, 
when the party won all but three of Scotland’s 59 seats in the House of Commons, the UK 
Government’s hand could effectively have been forced, with more powers devolved in an effort to 
                                                          
103 N Sturgeon, ‘Nicola Sturgeon’s speech on Scottish independence: full text’ (New Statesman, 13 March 2017) 
<http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/03/nicola-sturgeons-speech-scottish-independence-
full-text> 
104 G McKeever, ‘Brexit, the border and social security rights’ (2018) 25(X) Journal of Social Security Law XX 
105 P Collinson, ‘What price Scottish independence for an army of cross-border workers?’ (Guardian, 19 April 
2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/apr/19/scotland-vote-independence-yes-no-tax-pensions-
workers> 
106 M Simpson, ‘More devolution rather than independence: time for the SNP to rediscover the “middle way”’ 
(LSE British Politics and Policy, 10 July 2017) <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/time-for-the-snp-to-
rediscover-the-middle-way/> 
107 N Sturgeon, Leader’s speech (Scottish National Party conference, October 2017) 
108 Commission on Scottish Devolution, Serving Scotland better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st 
century (Edinburgh: Commission on Scottish Devolution, 2009) 
109 Smith Commission, Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament (Edinburgh: Smith Commission, 2014) 
110 R Syal, ‘Scottish independence: Brown to push for more devolution in event of no vote’ (Guardian, 5 
September 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/05/gordon-brown-scottish-
independence-devolution>; G Mooney and G Scott, ‘The 2014 Scottish independence debate: questions of 
social welfare and social justice’ (2015) 23(1) Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 5 
111 S Carrell, ‘Gordon Brown pushes “patriotic” third option for Scotland after Brexit’ (Guardian, 18 March 
2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/18/gordon-brown-to-push-patriotic-third-option-for-
more-powerful-scotland-after-brexit> 
112 C Jeffery, ‘Constitutional change – without end?’ (2015) 86(2) Political Quarterly 275, 275 
This is a pre-copy edited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in the Journal of Social 
Security Law following peer-review. The definitive published version (M Simpson, ‘Brexit and devolved social 
security in Scotland: a tale of two referenda’ (2018) 25(1) Journal of Social Security Law 56-73) is available 
online through Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service. 
curb enthusiasm for a new independence referendum. Although this did not happen, the resurgent 
Conservative vote in Scotland – where the party has gone from having no MPs in 1997 to becoming 
the main opposition party at Holyrood in 2016 and was arguably the main ‘winner’ in June 2017, 
with 13 Westminster seats gained – might yet come to be seen as an opportunity to make 
concessions from a position of strength, cementing the party’s electoral comeback and the decline 
of Scottish Labour since 2007.113 Alternatively, a successor to the Calman and Smith Commissions 
could be the price of SNP support for a future Labour minority government. 
Social security would be an obvious candidate for further devolution, indeed it is among the areas in 
which the Scottish Government advocates further devolution as it seeks to “protect Scotland’s 
interests” post-Brexit.114 The Scottish Government has a vision for a devolved system based on 
respect for the dignity of individuals and putting the user experience first (amongst other 
principles),115 but only a limited set of competences to enable it to put the vision into practice. The 
Scotland Act 2016 devolved competence for disability, carers’ and industrial injuries benefits, 
maternity, funeral and heating payments that previously fell within the regulated social fund, 
discretionary benefits including discretionary housing payments, food aid and the housing element 
of universal credit. Collectively these accounted for 14.6% of social security expenditure in Scotland 
in 2016.116 The Scottish Parliament also gained a power to top up reserved benefits, make certain 
changes to the payment arrangements for universal credit and control of employment support 
schemes. 117 Policy announcements to date have been limited,118 but indicate that the devolved 
system will, to a limited but real extent, be more generous than the equivalent benefits provided by 
DWP for England and Wales. For example, the level of carer’s allowance is to be raised to the same 
rate as jobseeker’s allowance and the introduction of a dedicated young carer’s benefit is proposed. 
There are no current proposals for significant changes to the level of or eligibility criteria for 
disability benefits,119 which are the largest part of the devolved system in terms of expenditure but 
will not come under Holyrood’s control until at least 2020.120 However, a Scotland anxious to burnish 
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its European credentials could in principle refrain from implementing any new restrictions on 
migrants’ eligibility for or the portability of personal independence payment resulting from the 
future disapplication of Regulations 1408/71 and 883/2004.121 
Since the main income replacement and family benefits remain largely reserved, there is currently 
no possibility of changing the eligibility rules as they apply in Scotland to ease immigrants’ access to 
the social security system, whether this were to mean rolling back some of the pre-Brexit restrictions 
on EU citizens’ entitlement to support or the non-implementation of any future changes. Even the 
devolution of the housing element of universal credit will be of limited impact as would-be claimants 
would have to be eligible for universal credit in the first place in order to benefit from any changes 
the Scottish Parliament might choose to make. While reserved benefits can be topped up, this power 
(similarly) can only be used to benefit those who are already eligible for the benefit according to the 
DWP criteria. Consequently, any aspiration to entice migrant workers to Scotland through easier 
access to the social security system in comparison to the rest of the UK could currently only be put 
into practice in respect of disability benefits. If new competences in respect of working age benefits 
were devolved, the Scottish Parliament would have the option of expanding (or at least resisting any 
dismantling of) EU citizens’ entitlements as one aspect of a pitch to would-be migrants and a 
manifestation of the ‘fairer’, more solidaristic society to which Scotland is claimed to aspire. 
Outright devolution of social security seems unlikely to take place in the near future; following the 
Smith report, Scottish civil servants observed that retirement pensions in particular would be a “big 
financial risk” to any devolved government and are too fundamental a part of the glue “that keeps 
the country together” for any UK government to contemplate devolution.122 State-wide risk pooling 
in unemployment benefits is also the norm in decentralised states.123 Even in the context of 
wholesale devolution, the experience of Northern Ireland, where full devolved competence since 
1921 has produced little significant policy divergence, shows that powerful forces in favour of a 
common UK approach to key benefits might remain.124 Scotland is subject to less intense fiscal 
pressures than its near neighbour, as the Barnett formula preserves a higher block grant than a 
needs-based formula would allow,125 enabling it to have higher levels of public spending than other 
                                                          
121 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons and their families moving within the Community (OJ L 149/2); Regulation (EC) no 883/2004 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems 
(OJ L 166/1); following withdrawal, the Regulations will continue to apply to individuals who were within their 
scope prior to withdrawal – Department for Exiting the European Union, ‘Joint report from the negotiators of 
the European Union and the United Kingdom government on progress during phase 1 negotiations under 
article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal from the European Union’ (London: DExEU, 2017) 
at [28] 
122 M Simpson, ‘The social citizenship of lone parents, 2010-2016: evolution and devolution’ (PhD thesis, Ulster 
University, 2016) 254, 259 
123 PE Peterson, The price of federalism (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1995); T Iversen, ‘Democracy 
and capitalism’ in FG Castles, S Leibfried, J Lewis, H Obinger and C Pierson (eds), The Oxford handbook of the 
welfare state (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 
124 M Simpson, ‘Developing constitutional principles through firefighting: social security parity in Northern 
Ireland’ (2015) 22(1) Journal of Social Security Law 31 
125 The Barnett Formula is based on three main elements: population, planned spending changes in UK 
Government departments and equivalence of function between UK and devolved departments – see HM 
Treasury, Funding the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly: 
statement of funding policy (HM Treasury, 2010) 13 and 39; notably, it is the change in rather than the overall 
level of per capita spending which is determined by Barnett, so higher levels of per capita expenditure in some 
This is a pre-copy edited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in the Journal of Social 
Security Law following peer-review. The definitive published version (M Simpson, ‘Brexit and devolved social 
security in Scotland: a tale of two referenda’ (2018) 25(1) Journal of Social Security Law 56-73) is available 
online through Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service. 
UK regions without raising the taxes under devolved control. If fiscal autonomy continues to 
increase, the Barnett bonus may well diminish. 126 In any case, after a certain point benefit levels are 
“likely to be constrained by existing funding limits unless Scottish politicians can persuade the 
electorate to pay… higher income tax,” while the operational challenge of “dismantling” systems 
inherited from DWP should not be underestimated. 127 
In the context of continued shared competence between the UK and Scottish Governments, the 
future oversight of the interaction of reserved and devolved benefits as well as the impact of any 
divergence that occurs on social rights within and freedom of movement between different parts of 
the UK – identified as problematic by McKeever128 – will become an issue of increasing urgency. 
McEwen and Petersohn argue that the politics of devolution in the UK have been characterised by an 
excessive focus on self-rule to the exclusion of shared rule. Both governments have contributed to 
this position. If Scottish Governments since 2007 have consistently sought to “maximise self-rule,” 
the UK Government is accused of being more interested in using the Scotland Office to advance its 
own interests in Scotland than in allowing it to “act as a voice for Scotland in national decision 
making.”129 With competence for key policy areas including personal taxation as well as social 
security now split between Holyrood and Westminster, this issue can be ignored no longer. Initial 
signs are mixed. The UK Government’s refusal to allow the Social Security Advisory Committee any 
remit in respect of devolved Scottish benefits seems explicable only by willingness to place 
intergovernmental (or unionist-nationalist) competition ahead of the best interests of the UK. Joint 
sessions of the Scottish Parliament Social Security Committee and House of Commons Scottish 
Affairs Committee are a positive step, but meetings have been blighted by squabbling over the 
appropriate way of referring to the social sector size criteria in housing benefit (imposition of a 
‘bedroom tax’ or removal of a ‘spare room subsidy’?) and apparent unwillingness on the part of the 
UK government to facilitate the Scottish Government’s totemic policy of disapplying the criteria in 
Scotland.130 Ministerial-level communication may or may not be more constructive, but takes place 
out of public view. 
Conclusion 
In common with other areas of policy, the impact of Brexit on social security in the UK will only 
become apparent over time. When the focus falls on Scottish social security specifically, any 
discussion of the likely implications inevitably strays even further into the realm of speculation. The 
relatively low-key role of the EU in shaping national social security systems means direct impacts, 
other than the rules on migrants’ access to host state benefits, are likely to be limited. Even in this 
area the EU has itself been willing to allow some diminution of the social rights of citizens exercising 
their right to freedom of movement, and to countenance further curbs. Indirect impacts may be 
more widespread. The political connections between critiques of the EU and of the ECHR (even 
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though the two issues are legally separate) and between Brexit and the future constitutional 
position of Scotland within the UK will be crucial here.  
While the Scottish Government and Scottish parliamentarians have been vocal critics of UK 
Government social security policy since 2011,131 prior to the Scotland Act 2016 Holyrood had little 
scope to set a distinctive course. Even the implementation of the Smith recommendations devolves 
only a rather limited set of social security competences, although the significance of control of 
disability benefits and the opportunity to top up reserved benefits should not be underestimated. 
Arguably, then, the biggest question to be answered in respect of devolved social security is whether 
Brexit will result in a wider revision of the devolution settlement with potential to hand control of 
additional benefits to the Scottish Parliament.  
Such a development could open the door to divergence in income replacement and family benefits, 
which are currently reserved, many of which are becoming less generous to claimants and where the 
UK government has already moved to curtail EU migrants’ rights even ahead of Brexit. A distinctive 
Scottish approach could be driven in part by legal requirements, particularly if the Human Rights Act 
1998 were repealed but the obligation of compliance with the ECHR in the Scotland Act 1998 
retained. However, at present the more important considerations are political, notably whether (and 
how) the Scottish Government might elect to enhance the protection of social rights in Scottish law, 
put into practice its pledge to base its social security system on respect for the dignity of individuals 
and seek to attract immigration to an economy claimed to need it more than other parts of the UK. 
Collectively, these considerations could underpin greater generosity in and easier access for 
migrants to certain benefits. To get to this point, though, a great number of ‘what ifs’ must be 
addressed. 
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